Do tenants have exclusive possession of the property they live in so that landlords cannot force entry to gain access into the property? Keith Chipato considers recent cases which show judges appear to be divided on the question.
In the most recent case of Stonewater Ltd v Mrs Rosie Marie Harris [2026] EWCC 42, HHJ Glen seeks to address the matter considering multiple cases that have dealt with the issue over the last 2 years.
However, to add context, the previous cases are addressed first.
- In Sovereign Housing Association Ltd v Hall [2024] EWCC 32, HHJ Berkeley in the appeal held that CPR 70.2A was applicable where an injunction had been made and not complied with. To add to the differing judicial opinions, the first instance judge held that the court did not have jurisdiction to order forced access as the correct approach for lack of compliance with an injunction was a committal application for contempt.
- DJ Cridge took a different approach in Southern Housing v Emmanuel [2026] L&TR 9. He held that there was no statutory authority to allow forced access. His view was that CPR 70.2A did not allow forced access on the basis that the injunction was for the defendant to allow the claimant in, which was different to forced access. The ‘act’ for the purposes of CPR 70.2A could not be carried out by another person, or another person outside the defendant's home without a key.
- In Taylor Clark Ltd v Mohamed (2026) Unrep, DJ Le Bas found the relevant ‘act’ for purposes of CPR 70.2A was facilitation of access rather than for the tenant to give permission for access to be granted. The judge also highlighted that the court was merely giving effect to the contractual obligations the tenant covenanted to. Therefore, he found that the court could grant permission for forced access.
- DJ James in Plymouth Community Homes Ltd v Hammond [2026] EWCC 27 came to the conclusion that the ‘act’ under CPR 70.2A was ‘the giving or granting, or the obtaining or gaining of access.’ The learned judge described this as taking a purposive rather than literal approach to CPR 70.2A.
HHJ Glen then considered the issue having reviewed all the cases above in Stonewater v Harris. He stated:
23. There can be no doubting the erudition of District Judge Cridge's analysis of the jurisprudence behind the proposition that 'an Englishman's home is his castle'. Indeed, it is hardly needed having regard to the operation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. With respect to him, this does not however provide an answer to applications of this type.
24. His broad conclusion that a court has no power to authorise entry to someone's home absent statutory authority cannot in my judgment be supported. One obvious illustration of such a power is what is now known as a search and imaging order, stemming from Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55 . Such orders can authorise entry to a person's dwelling, albeit that in Lock International plc v. Beswick [1989] 1 WLR 1268 this was described as the "…absolute extremity of the court's powers…" . Furthermore, a specific power is provided for by CPR25.1(d) in aid of interim remedies.
25. I am however equally of the view that the 'deemed consent' approach relied upon by District Judge Le Bas and adopted by Mr Rothwell cannot be correct. In covenanting to allow access, the tenant is binding themselves contractually to give access when asked to do so. They are not agreeing that the landlord can without more enter the premises as and when notice to do so has been given.
HHJ Glen then continued to find that if the ‘act’ for purposes of CPR 70.2A is defined as allowing access, this was too narrow of a view. He preferred DJ James’ reasoning of defining the ‘act’ as it was enabling the landlord to obtain access. Therefore, forced entry or access was permissible.
However, HHJ Glen set out a number of considerations including that forced access will normally not be appropriate to be ordered at the first hearing and that information about the household is usually needed. He also highlighted it was good practice to affix a key safe to the outside of the property.
This judgment appears to be fair way to deal with forced access cases. The court appears to strike a balance between the tenant’s rights and the landlord’s rights. The judge rightly pointed out that the alternative remedy of a committal of contempt of court application is both unattractive and disproportionate calling it ‘taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut’.
It is unlikely that tenants would prefer to potentially be imprisoned over forced entry as a result of not providing access pursuant to an injunction. It is also unlikely to produce the result that landlords ultimately want, access to the property.
Given this judgment and comments made about the drafting of tenancy agreement clauses, it will be interesting to see how this develops further. There is yet to be a higher court to consider this issue.