Genevieve Screeche-Powell and Andrew Burrell acted for a local authority to successfully resist a second appeal in a homelessness challenge on its behalf.
Main issue before the Court of Appeal
The appeal concerned the role of causation in the meaning of being “homeless intentionally” under section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996.
Background to the appeal
The appellant, Mr Cifci, was housed by Bromley Council in a privately-owned dwelling on Church Road under the main housing duty. The landlord served notice to quit.
The day before the notice expired, the council offered Mr Cifci alternative accommodation on Brighton Road, which he refused.
The council insisted that he leave Church Road immediately and discharged its duty towards him, but housed him in discretionary accommodation on Sutton High Street for a short time thereafter.
Mr Cifci then presented himself to Sutton Council as homeless. The reviewing officer concluded he was homeless intentionally because he had refused an offer of alternative accommodation.
Mr Cifci appealed.
He argued that:
- he was not homeless intentionally because nothing he did caused him to cease to occupy Church Road
- what caused him to leave was the fact that the landlord wanted the property back.
Court of Appeal judgment
The Court of Appeal unanimously held that the LB Sutton’s reviewing officer was entitled to conclude that Mr Cifci was homeless intentionally.
The test to be applied was set out by Lord Reed in Haile v Waltham Forest LBC: “whether he deliberately did or failed to do anything in consequence of which he ceased to occupy accommodation[…]”
Applying this test, Newey LJ held that Mr Cifci left Church Road because Bromley offered him accommodation on Sutton High Street.
The appropriate question then becomes why Bromley offered that accommodation.
The answer was: because Mr Cifci refused the offer of Brighton Road but nevertheless declined to vacate Church Road.
Even if the landlord’s notice also caused his departure from Church Road, it sufficed that one of the causes was a deliberate act of the appellant.
What does the decision in Cifci v LB Sutton mean for local authorities?
The judgment will be welcome news to local authorities in several respects.
Local authorities increasingly rely on temporary accommodation owned by private landlords to discharge their housing duties. Yet this is precarious. Landlords frequently decide to take back the property to rent it out privately or to undertake substantial repairs.
This judgment ensures that, in such cases, where local authorities make a timely offer of alternative accommodation which the applicant refuses, the applicant cannot simply reapply immediately for homelessness support in the hope of getting better accommodation, safe in the knowledge that, because they are not homeless intentionally, they must be rehoused.
As Falk LJ noted in her concurring judgment, such an outcome would frustrate section 193(5) of the Housing Act 1996, which allows local authorities to discharge the main housing duty where the applicant refuses a single offer of suitable alternative accommodation.
The case also reminds local authorities that courts will adopt a benevolent, realistic and practical approach to their interpretation of decisions made by their reviewing officers.
It is anticipated that the appellant will seek permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Read the full judgment in Cifci v LB Sutton [2025] EWCA Civ 1480.